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The influence of non-visual information on visual awareness judgments has recently
gained substantial interest. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
we investigate the potential contribution of evidence from the motor system to judgment
of visual awareness. We hypothesized that TMS-induced activity in the primary motor
cortex (M1) would increase reported visual awareness as compared to the control
condition. Additionally, we investigated whether TMS-induced motor-evoked potential
(MEP) could measure accumulated evidence for stimulus perception. Following stimulus
presentation and TMS, participants first rated their visual awareness verbally using
the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), after which they responded manually to a
Gabor orientation identification task. Delivering TMS to M1 resulted in higher average
awareness ratings as compared to the control condition, in both correct and incorrect
identification task response trials, when the hand with which participants responded was
contralateral to the stimulated hemisphere (TMS-response-congruent trials). This effect
was accompanied by longer PAS response times (RTs), irrespective of the congruence
between TMS and identification response. Moreover, longer identification RTs were
observed in TMS-response-congruent trials in the M1 condition as compared to the
control condition. Additionally, the amplitudes of MEPs were related to the awareness
ratings when response congruence was taken into account. We argue that MEP can
serve as an indirect measure of evidence accumulated for stimulus perception and that
longer PAS RTs and higher amplitudes of MEPs in the M1 condition reflect integration
of additional evidence with visual awareness judgment. In conclusion, we advocate that
motor activity influences perceptual awareness judgments.
Keywords: awareness scale, identification task, motor cortex, motor-evoked potential, transcranial magnetic
stimulation, visual perception
Abbreviations: 2AFC, two-alternative forced choice; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; FDI, first dorsal interosseous;
M1, primary motor cortex; MEP, motor-evoked potential; MSO, maximal stimulator output; PAS, Perceptual Awareness
Scale; PFC, prefrontal cortex; PMd, dorsal premotor cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; RMT, resting motor threshold;
RTs, response times; S1, primary somatosensory cortex; SD, standard deviation; SEs, standard errors; TMS, transcranial
magnetic stimulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncovering the neural processes that shape conscious content is
considered a central problem in consciousness science (Faivre
et al., 2017). Access to conscious content is based on the
accumulation of stimulus-based evidence, prior knowledge, and
biases (Dehaene, 2008; Lau, 2008; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;
Overgaard, 2018). We consider conscious access to be a non-
dichotomous phenomenon (Overgaard et al., 2006; Kouider
et al., 2010; Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016, 2018a; Jonkisz et al.,
2017; Lyyra, 2019, for alternative explanations see: Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004; Del Cul et al., 2007) that is reflected in awareness
judgments (Overgaard et al., 2006; Anzulewicz et al., 2019).
Therefore, we operationalize conscious access with perceptual
awareness ratings. This approach is consistent with several major
views on consciousness, including the hierarchical view (Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011), the Partial Awareness Hypothesis (Kouider
et al., 2010), and some current understandings of conscious
access, e.g., the Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness
(Fazekas and Overgaard, 2016, 2018a). Perceptual awareness
judgments—like decision confidence judgments—are a type of
metacognitive judgment (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Fleming,
2020) and can be measured on multiple scales, such as continuous
visual analog scales (Hayes and Patterson, 1921; Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004) and the PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004).
The latter requires participants to rate stimulus awareness with
ratings ranging between “no experience” and “a clear experience.”
PAS is considered a sensitive and exhaustive measure of
stimulus awareness (Sandberg et al., 2010) and is widely used in
consciousness research (Sandberg and Overgaard, 2015).
Multiple theories frame conscious access (more or less
explicitly) in the context of stimulus evidence accumulation
(Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene, 2008; Lamme, 2010; Block, 2011;
Mudrik et al., 2016). This has bound research to experimental
paradigms that manipulate stimuli characteristics; however, the
physical qualities of stimuli do not fully explain the qualities
of conscious access, which implies the presence of additional
sources of evidence (Anzulewicz and Wierzchoń, 2018; Tagliabue
et al., 2019). Several such sources have been proposed, e.g., prior
expectations (Snyder et al., 2015), previous responses (Rahnev
et al., 2015), or attentional engagement (Fazekas and Overgaard,
2018b). Nevertheless, these sources are associated with the early
stages of awareness-related processing (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2014).
Here, we present an investigation of motor-related information
influence that occurs at the later stages of awareness-related
processing on stimulus awareness judgment.
Out of many possible contributors, the motor system
seems especially related to perception. Numerous studies have
explored the action–perception loop and have shown that in
tasks requiring coordination of perceptual information and
action, both systems influence each other and enhance task
performance (Hecht et al., 2001; Donnarumma et al., 2017).
Similar conclusions have come from experiments in which
coupling between perception and action was more superficial
than in action–perception loop procedures (e.g., linking certain
stimuli to particular response keys: Siedlecka et al., 2019, 2020a).
A recent study showed that visual awareness judgments are
sensitive to accuracy feedback in a stimulus identification task
(Siedlecka et al., 2020b). Participants reported lower awareness
after an incorrect response in the previous trial, and the effect was
strengthened by trial-by-trial accuracy feedback.
Nevertheless, a couple of studies have presented a more
immediate effect that shapes the experience of just-presented
stimuli. Several studies have shown a consistent effect of
identification tasks and rating response order on the association
between metacognitive ratings and identification task accuracy
(Wierzchoń et al., 2014; Siedlecka et al., 2016; Wokke et al.,
2020). These studies’ authors suggested that carrying out a
behavioral response acts as an additional source of evidence
for metacognitive judgments. Following this, Anzulewicz et al.
(2019) listed four possible mechanisms through which action
planning or execution could influence reported awareness. They
point to possible (1) indirect effects that stem from motor cortex
activity that affects cognitive processing, (2) perceptual evidence
accumulation being influenced by attentional engagement, (3)
enhancement of performance monitoring, and (4) integration
of additional (including post-perceptual) evidence with the
evidence accumulation process.
It has been shown that the evidence accumulation process is
strongly coupled with the presence of perceptual stimulation, but
it continues even after its disappearance and might persist after
stimulus-related decision to inform metacognitive judgments
(Yeung and Summerfield, 2012; Murphy et al., 2015; Navajas
et al., 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017; Wokke et al., 2020); this
is what we refer to as post-perceptual evidence accumulation. In
the current study, unlike in speed 2AFC tasks oftentimes used
to measure perceptual evidence accumulation, we focus on post-
perceptual evidence accumulation for formation of metacognitive
judgment. The hypothesis that post-perceptual information can
concurrently influence metacognitive judgment is supported by
Gajdos et al. (2019). The authors showed that higher confidence
ratings were observed in trials in which an identification response
to a stimulus was preceded by partial muscular activation. They
argued that such muscle activity could contribute to participants’
confidence in their identification response to a stimulus, but
it could not influence the identification task itself. However,
these studies do not provide sufficient evidence to prove that
partial muscular activations influence confidence judgment and
not the opposite.
This issue of causal relation can be partially resolved
by experimentally introducing additional M1 activity that is
unrelated to the main task. In Siedlecka et al. (2019), this
was achieved by including an irrelevant task that participants
performed between stimulus presentation and PAS rating.
Performing an additional motor response congruent with the
response scheme of the identification task led to higher awareness
ratings than when performing an incongruent one. At the same
time, the congruence between the additional motor response and
the identification task response was not related. Siedlecka et al.’s
experiment provides arguments for the influence of motor system
activity on visual awareness judgment. Although it cannot be
ruled out that in this task the additional response itself or the
visual information from the additional task cue were responsible
for the observed effect, two other recent studies show an effect of
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action on confidence ratings. Faivre et al. (2020) have shown that
sensorimotor conflicts might decrease metacognitive efficiency
(a quantitative measure of participants’ level of metacognitive
ability, given a certain level of 2AFC task performance), and
Filevich et al. (2020) have presented that continuous report
paired to stimulus presentation leads to higher confidence
ratings; however, there was no evidence that absolute confidence
judgments or metacognitive efficiency varies with the presence or
absence of overt responses.
Assessment of the selective effect of motor information on
visual awareness judgments requires directly altering motor
cortex activity. Fleming et al. (2015) attempted this by applying
single-pulse TMS either before or after a 2AFC task followed
by decision confidence rating. They showed that TMS applied
to the PMd that was associated with the chosen response was
associated with higher response confidence and consequently
higher metacognitive efficiency than TMS associated with the
unchosen response, while no evidence for the influence of TMS
on identification accuracy was found. The TMS effect on mean
confidence rating was observed for TMS applied both before and
after the identification response, thus suggesting the contribution
of post-decision processes to confidence in one’s identification
decision. None of these effects was observed for TMS applied
to M1. Fleming et al. suggested that PMd but not M1 activity
contributes to confidence ratings. However, both TMS intensity
and the number of participants taking part in the experiment
were relatively low, thus encouraging the collection of more
evidence on this matter.
Considering the limitations of the previous research, we
investigated whether externally introduced motor-related
information can be integrated into judgment of visual awareness.
To achieve this, we delivered twitch-causing TMS to an M1
representation of the index finger involved in providing
identification responses to mimic the influence of identification
response on metacognitive judgment. Moreover, we used verbally
reported PAS to separate the TMS and the identification response
to minimize TMS-induced motor activity’s interference with
the activity that resulted from the intentional identification
task decision. Based on Fleming et al.’s (2015) results, we did
not expect to observe the influence of TMS on identification
decision performance, including its RT. Based on Siedlecka
et al.’s (2019) findings, we expected to observe higher awareness
ratings in the M1 condition compared to the control condition
(TMS to the interhemispheric cleft). In addition, we calculated
response-specific metacognitive efficiency measures. Since in
our experiment, the scale response preceded the identification
response and we asked for perceptual awareness judgments (not
confidence judgments) in identification task decisions, we did
not expect to observe any difference in metacognitive efficiency
between M1 and the control TMS condition.
To actively monitor the precision of TMS delivery, we
recorded MEP amplitudes on the response finger that was
contralateral to the stimulation side. It has been established
that imagined unilateral movements increase the excitability
of contralateral M1 (Jeannerod, 1995; Facchini et al., 2002;
Fourkas et al., 2006). Previous research on MEP has shown
that its amplitude can reflect the level of M1 excitability
(Fitzgerald et al., 2002). For these reasons, we expected M1
excitability to be influenced by the preparatory motor plan
for the subsequent identification response proportionally to
the accumulated evidence for the identification decision. This
should lead to a correlation between MEP amplitudes and
PAS ratings as well as a correlation between PAS ratings and
their RTs, thus representing accumulated evidence for visual
awareness judgment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experiment was carried out in the TMS Laboratory at
the Neurology Clinic of Jagiellonian University Hospital. The
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute
of Psychology at Jagiellonian University and was carried out in
accordance with the guidelines for TMS research (Rossi et al.,
2009; Rossini et al., 2015) and the Declaration of Helsinki
(Holm, 2019).
Participants
Healthy volunteers meeting the criteria for participation in
TMS studies (no history of neurological disorders, psychiatric
disorders, head injury, etc., as assessed by a safety screening
questionnaire) and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
were recruited using advertisements on social media. One
participant dropped out due to TMS-induced headache, while
46 participants (one reported left-handedness, 11 males, 35
females, Mage = 23.2, range = 19–37) completed the study. The
general purpose of the experiment was explained to participants,
and they were informed that they could withdraw at any time
without giving a reason. Prior to the experiment, the participants
completed safety screening questionnaires and signed informed
consent forms. After the experiment, they received monetary
compensation (160 PLN).
Session Overview
The experiment was conducted using a within-participant design
in a single session. Participants practiced (15 trials, ∼2 min)
the procedure, with the identification task preceding the PAS
rating within each trial (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Sandberg
et al., 2010). Then a 1-up-3-down staircase was used to estimate
the stimulus contrast (100 trials; step sizes from 0.9 to 0.5%,
starting with 12% of the maximal contrast of the monitor)
that would lead to approximately 79% correct responses. The
median stimulus contrasts for each PAS rating were calculated
based on all trials acquired in the staircase procedure (∼5 min)
for use in the following experimental procedure, in which
four fixed contrasts were used in a random manner and with
equal probability (PAS1: mean = 10.22%, SD = 1.90; PAS2:
mean = 10.65%, SD = 1.87; PAS3: mean = 11.21%, SD = 1.93;
PAS4: mean = 12.29%, SD = 1.96). The same contrasts were used
for M1 and control conditions.
Subsequently, individual RMTs for TMS were determined,
and participants completed a 32-trial training session that
was identical to the experimental procedure: TMS pulses were
applied to the left M1, and the PAS rating was followed by
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the identification task response. Finally, they completed the
experimental task, which consisted of two conditions in four
counterbalanced blocks (two blocks of TMS to M1, and two
blocks of TMS to interhemispheric cleft, alternately). Each block
consisted of 100 trials, which summed up to 400 trials that took
about 45 min to complete.
Stimuli and Procedure
The task was coded in PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007) and
was run on a PC. Participants placed their heads on a chinrest,
60 cm away from an LCD monitor (1920 × 1080 resolution,
60 Hz refresh rate). A microphone was attached to the chinrest
for the purpose of PAS verbal responses recording. In the
experimental task at first, a fixation dot was presented for 500 ms.
A Gabor patch masked with white noise was then displayed for
33 ms. Gabor patches were tilted left or right (−45◦ or 45◦ of
rotation from vertical angle, respectively; 128 × 128 pixels, which
translated to ∼3◦ of visual angle, spatial frequency ∼4 cycles per
degree, embedded in the same size white noise against the gray
background) presented centrally on the screen. A white noise
patch of constant contrast was presented with the stimulus to
reduce its visibility. Stimulus presentation was followed by an
empty screen displayed for 450 ms. Subsequently (i.e., 483 ms
from the stimulus onset), a TMS pulse was administered and a
screen prompting the PAS rating (with the points of the scale
defined as 0 = no experience; 1 = a brief glimpse; 2 = an almost
clear experience; 3 = a clear experience) was displayed for 3 s
dedicated to provide a verbal response. Irrespective of whether
a verbal response was provided or not, PAS was followed by
a screen prompting a behavioral response to the identification
task that was displayed until a keyboard button was pressed up
to 3 s (either “Z” with the left index finger or “M” with the
right one). Participants did not receive any feedback about their
performance. Figure 1 outlines the temporal organization of an
experimental trial.
TMS Parameters
Biphasic TMS was delivered with a Magstim Super Rapid2 Plus1
stimulator using a 70 mm Double Air Film Coil at 110% of
the individual RMT (average intensity = 65.87% of the MSO,
SD = 10.67). The electromyographic signal was recorded from
the FDI muscle of the right index finger throughout the whole
experimental procedure. The individual RMT estimation started
with applying TMS at 50% of MSO to the left M1. Then, by
varying the stimulation intensity, the site where suprathreshold
TMS induced the maximal twitch in the right index FDI muscle
was established. Afterward, the lowest intensity that resulted in an
MEP of more than 50 µV peak-to-peak amplitude in five out of 10
consecutive trials was determined. In the control condition, TMS
was applied to the interhemispheric cleft between the superior
parietal lobules, with the coil handle pointing backward. The site
of stimulation and the tangential position of the coil in relation to
the scalp were monitored using the average brain template in the
Brainsight 2.3 neuronavigation system. For the M1 stimulation,
the main axis of the coil was oriented at 45◦ offset from the
posterior–anterior (PA) direction, but it remained untilted for the
control condition. The current induced in the brain was PA–AP.
Participants wore earplugs for noise protection throughout the
duration of TMS.
Data Analysis
No statistical analyses were conducted before the completion
of the experiment and no participants who completed the
experiment were excluded from the analysis. Trials with no
PAS response and identification response were removed; the
remaining data (17,969 trials, 97.7%) were analyzed using the R
statistical environment (R Core Team, 2019). We used mixed-
effects regression models fitted with the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) and compared the models of different complexity
with ANOVA to determine which models describe the data the
most accurately. The R notations of the models presented in
the results section can be found in the data analysis scripts1.
To obtain approximate p-values via Satterthwaite’s method, we
used the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). Additionally,
we used the phia (De Rosario-Martinez, 2015) and emmeans
packages (Lenth, 2019) for pairwise comparisons, employing
Tukey’s method for family-wise error rate correction. We used
code provided in an implementation of response-specific meta-
d’ (Maniscalco and Lau, 2014) to calculate (1) identification task
sensitivity index d’, (2) type 1 criterion indicating identification
response bias, and (3) M-ratio (meta-d’/d’), which is a measure
of metacognitive efficiency in which metacognitive sensitivity
(operationalized with meta-d’) is corrected for objective task
sensitivity (operationalized with d’; Fleming and Lau, 2014).
The M-ratio indicates the amount of evidence available for
metacognitive judgment relative to the amount of evidence
available for objective decision, e.g., the M-ratio value of 0.8
indicates that 20% of the sensory evidence available for the
objective decision is lost when making metacognitive judgments,
while M-ratio value of 1.2 suggests that more evidence is available
for metacognitive judgments than for objective decision that
can be due to further processing of stimulus information or
gaining non-perceptual information (Fleming, 2017). For MEP-
related calculations, for every trial, the highest peak-to-peak
amplitude was determined in the 75 ms after the TMS pulse,
irrespective of the condition. We intended to present results
from the full dataset, therefore we did not limit analysis to
trials in which the MEP amplitude exceeded 50 µV, as is
commonly done (Anderson and George, 2009). In order to
convert verbal recordings with PAS ratings into a machine-
readable format, we used Python’s Speech Recognition package
(Zhang, 2017); we calculated speech onset with Chronset and
trials for which the algorithm failed were corrected manually.
RTs were measured either from the PAS screen or the onset
of the identification task response cue. We use congruence
between TMS and identification response as a fixed factor.
Although no TMS-induced movement was present in the
control condition, we used congruence to refer to right-hand
responses. Because TMS was limited to the left hemisphere,
all responses provided with the right index finger were TMS-
response congruent (congruent trials, n = 8,933), while all
those provided with the left index finger were TMS-response
1https://osf.io/29n6j
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of an experimental trial. First, a fixation dot was presented for 500 ms. A Gabor patch masked with white noise was then
displayed, followed by an empty screen. Subsequently, a TMS pulse was administered and a screen prompting the PAS rating was displayed to allow a verbal
response. Irrespective of whether a verbal response was provided or not, PAS was followed by a screen prompting a behavioral response to the identification task
that was displayed until a response was made up to 3 s. Participants did not receive any feedback about their performance. Trials were separated with intertrial
intervals of variable length.
incongruent (incongruent trials, n = 9,036). We used non-
directional tests with α level set at 5%.
RESULTS
Identification Task
Identification task accuracy data were analyzed using a logistic
mixed-effects regression model with condition and congruence
as fixed effects. All effects were taken as random at the participant
level. As expected, no significant differences in accuracy were
found (see Table 1 for the model summary and Figure 2): neither
between the control and M1 conditions within congruent trials
(z = 0.87, p = 0.384), nor between incongruent and congruent
trials within the M1 condition (z = −0.07, p = 0.944). No
interaction between condition and congruence was observed
(z = −0.68, p = 0.497). Taken together, no evidence was thus
found for a general effect of the M1 condition on the accuracy,
despite the high number of trials and participants.
Moreover, we calculated d’ and the type 1 criterion for every
participant for both TMS conditions separately; we fitted a linear
mixed-effects model with condition as a fixed factor, and a
participant-specific intercept as a random effect. No difference
in d’ [t(45.0) = −0.86, p = 0.394] and the type 1 criterion
[t(45.0) = −1.107, p = 0.274] between the M1 condition and
TABLE 1 | Results summary of the mixed-effects logistic regression model for
accuracy with TMS condition and TMS-response congruence as fixed effects;
participant-specific condition effect, congruence effect, and intercept were used
as random effects.
Estimate SE z p
(Intercept) 1.738 0.11 15.58 <0.001***
TMS condition 0.063 0.07 0.87 0.384




−0.059 0.09 −0.68 0.497
Significance code: ***p < 0.001.
the control condition was observed. The analysis thus did not
find evidence for a difference in the identification ability and the
response criterion in the identification task across conditions.
To investigate identification RTs, we fitted a linear mixed-
effects regression model with interactions between condition,
congruence, and PAS rating as fixed effects. All effects were taken
as random at the participant level. We found that the RTs in
the M1 condition were significantly longer than in the control
condition within congruent trials [t(86.78) = 2.30, p = 0.024];
also, in the M1 condition, congruent trials took longer than
incongruent ones [t(99.99) = 3.05, p = 0.003]. Additionally, we
were interested in how these RT differences manifested across
PAS ratings. Conditional pairwise comparisons revealed that
identification RTs for the middle ratings were significantly longer
FIGURE 2 | Mean identification task accuracy depending on TMS condition
and TMS-response congruence. Error bars represent SEs.
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TABLE 2 | Pairwise comparisons of identification RTs’ regression coefficients for
the linear mixed-effects regression model with interactions between condition,
congruence, and PAS rating as fixed effects, and with participant-specific
condition effect, congruence effect, and intercept as random effects. P values
adjusted with Tukey correction method. (A) Comparisons of estimates for each
PAS rating between M1 and control condition in congruent trials. (B) Comparisons
of estimates for each PAS rating between congruent and incongruent trials in
the M1 condition.
Estimate SE z Ratio p Adjusted
(A) Congruent,
M1—Control
PAS 0 19.58 10.54 1.86 0.247
PAS 1 22.37 8.19 2.73 0.032*
PAS 2 25.49 8.95 2.85 0.023*
PAS 3 5.68 13.64 0.42 0.976
(B) M1, Congruent—
Incongruent
PAS 0 16.08 10.13 1.59 0.386
PAS 1 27.92 7.65 3.65 0.002**
PAS 2 25.94 8.57 3.03 0.013*
PAS 3 4.33 13.16 0.33 0.988
Significance code: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Mean identification task RT depending on TMS-response
congruence, TMS condition, and PAS rating. Error bars represent SEs.
Significance code: *p < 0.05.
in the M1 condition compared to the control condition within
congruent trials. The same was observed for congruent trials as
compared to incongruent trials within the M1 condition (see
Table 2 and Figure 3). In sum, identification responses were
slower when the TMS influenced the muscle activity of the hand
with which participants responded to stimuli which were detected
but not seen clearly, thus indicating an extended evaluation
process in these cases.
TABLE 3 | Results summary of the linear mixed-effects model for PAS ratings with
condition and TMS-response congruence as fixed effects; participant-specific
condition effect, congruence effect, and intercept were used as random effects.
Estimate SE t (df) p
(Intercept) 1.344 0.074 18.20 (45.7) <0.00***
TMS condition −0.050 0.028 −1.76 (66.5) 0.083.
TMS-response
congruence




−0.054 0.024 −2.30 (17829.3) 0.021*
Significance code: ***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, .p < 0.1.
PAS Ratings
To test the impact of TMS on PAS ratings, we fitted a linear
mixed-effects model with interaction between condition and
congruence as fixed effects. All effects were taken as random
at the participant level. We used linear modeling to achieve
comparability with the previous study of Fleming et al. (2015)
and because the available implementations of ordinal models
do not allow random effects in individual thresholds (Bürkner
and Vuorre, 2019). We observed a significant interaction
between condition and congruence [t(17,829.20) = −2.30,
p = 0.021, see Table 3 for regression model summary]. We
reparameterized the model to check the effect of the TMS
condition that was nested in the TMS-response congruence effect
and observed a numerically higher mean PAS rating in M1
compared to the control condition in congruent [t(66.46) = 1.76,
p = 0.083] but not incongruent trials [t(65.84) = −0.16,
p = 0.876].
Since Fleming et al. (2015) observed a similar effect in
correct trials and a reversed pattern (higher confidence in
incongruent than congruent trials) in incorrect trials, we ran
the model separately for subsets of correct (n = 14,841) and
incorrect (n = 3,128) identification response trials. The results
pattern did not depend on accuracy. For correct trials, we
observed a significant effect of interaction between condition and
congruence [t(14,751.0) = −2.54, p = 0.011] and a significantly
higher mean PAS rating in M1 compared to the control condition
in congruent [t(70.93) = 1.20, p = 0.050] but not in incongruent
trials [t(70.33) = 0.16, p = 0.795; Figures 4A,C]. In incorrect
trials, a significant interaction between condition and congruence
[t(1,650.52) = −2.01, p = 0.044] was also present. There
was a significantly higher mean PAS rating in M1 compared
to the control condition within congruent [t(90.90) = 2.04,
p = 0.044] but not incongruent trials [t(88.23) = 0.44, p = 0.659;
Figures 4B,D]. The reparameterization of the model did not
show an effect of congruence [t(50.71) = 0.94, p = 0.354] in
M1 correct trials, but it revealed a significant difference between
congruent and incongruent trials [t(74.70) = 2.05, p = 0.044] in
incorrect M1 trials (see Figures 4A,B).
Additionally, to compare RTs of PAS ratings, we fitted a
mixed-effects linear regression model with interactions between
condition, congruence, and PAS ratings as fixed effects. All effects
were taken as random at the participant level. This analysis
revealed that the PAS rating RTs in the M1 condition were
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Mean PAS rating depending on TMS condition and TMS-response congruence in correct trials. (B) Mean PAS ratings for TMS condition and
TMS-response congruence in incorrect trials. (C) PAS ratings’ distributions depending on TMS-response congruence and TMS condition in correct trials. (D) PAS
ratings’ distributions depending on TMS-response congruence and TMS condition in incorrect trials. Error bars represent SEs. Significance code: *p < 0.05.
significantly longer than in the control condition [t(59.38) = 3.58,
p < 0.001] within congruent trials. Since no interaction between
condition and congruence was observed [t(17,749.88) = 0.31,
p = 0.754], the effect was observed for both congruent and
incongruent trials. The pairwise comparisons revealed evidence
that the effect applied to the two lowest ratings’ RTs (see Table 4
and Figure 5 for pairwise comparisons).
M-Ratio
To test whether there was a difference in metacognitive
efficiency between the M1 and control conditions, we calculated
M-ratios for every participant for TMS and congruence
conditions separately. We fitted a linear mixed-effects model with
condition and congruence as fixed factors, and with participant-
specific condition effect and intercept as random effects. We
found no significant effect of condition [t(91.6) = −0.15,
p = 0.882] or congruence [t(90.0) = 0.98, p = 0.332], and no
interaction between condition and congruence was observed
[t(90.0) = −0.48, p = 0.630; see Figure 6]. It should be noted that
due to the greater analysis complexity, these tests may have lower
statistical power than the other analyses presented in the paper
(Kristensen et al., 2020). However, because there was an increase
in PAS ratings for both correct and incorrect trials, we did not
expect to observe a difference in M-ratio.
MEP Amplitudes
To test differences in MEP amplitudes, we fitted a linear mixed-
effects model with interaction between condition, congruence,
and PAS rating as fixed effects, and with participant-specific
condition effects, congruence effect, and intercept as random
effects. Since only M1 TMS was supposed to influence the
motor cortex, a significant difference between MEP amplitudes
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TABLE 4 | Pairwise comparisons of PAS RTs’ regression coefficients of the linear
mixed-effects regression model with interactions between condition, congruence,
and PAS ratings as fixed effects, and participant-specific condition effect,
congruence effect, PAS rating effect, and intercept as random effects.
Estimate SE z Ratio p Adjusted
(A) Incongruent,
M1—Control
PAS 0 79.75 18.8 4.23 <0.001***
PAS 1 69.67 16.0 4.36 <0.001***
PAS 2 38.06 17.2 2.21 0.119
PAS 3 33.98 23.0 1.48 0.452
(B) Congruent,
M1—Control
PAS 0 69.44 19.0 3.66 0.001**
PAS 1 80.44 16.2 4.99 <0.001***
PAS 2 39.48 17.0 2.32 0.094.
PAS 3 20.24 23.0 0.88 0.815
P values adjusted with Tukey correction method. (A) Comparisons of estimates
for each PAS rating between M1 and control condition in incongruent trials. (B)
Comparisons of estimates for each PAS rating between M1 and control condition
in congruent trials. Significance code: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, .p < 0.1.
FIGURE 5 | PAS ratings’ mean RTs as a function of response congruence and
TMS condition. The error bars represent SEs. Significance code:
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, p < 0.1.
in the M1 condition compared to the control condition
was observed [t(45.81) = 10.61, p < 0.001]. Interestingly,
there was a significant interaction between congruence and
condition [t(17465.41) = 5.70, p < 0.001], and the results of
the model reparameterization showed significantly higher MEP
amplitudes in congruent trials [t(116.09) = 6.55, p < 0.001].
Additionally, we were interested in determining whether this
difference was related to PAS ratings. Therefore, we performed
pairwise comparisons of MEP amplitudes for each PAS rating
FIGURE 6 | Mean M-ratio depending on TMS condition and TMS-response
congruence. The error bars represent SEs.
TABLE 5 | Pairwise comparisons of mean MEP amplitude regression coefficients
of the linear mixed-effects regression model with interactions between condition,
congruence, and PAS ratings as fixed effects, and with participant-specific
condition effect, congruence effect, and intercept as random effects.
M1, Congruent—Incongruent Estimate SE z Ratio p Adjusted
PAS 0 44.46 16.16 2.75 0.030*
PAS 1 33.46 11.97 2.80 0.026*
PAS 2 50.43 13.56 3.72 0.001**
PAS 3 114.23 21.20 5.39 <0.001***
P values adjusted with Tukey correction method. Comparisons of estimates for
each PAS rating between congruent and incongruent trials in the M1 condition.
Significance code: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
between congruent and incongruent trials in the M1 condition.
Comparing amplitudes of MEPs across PAS ratings gradually
yielded significant differences (see Table 5 and Figure 7 for
detailed results).
To determine if it is possible to discern PAS rating from
the preceding MEP, we compared amplitudes from trials with
different PAS ratings. Only trials with rating 3 (a clear experience)
were significantly different from the others, irrespective of
congruence (see Table 6 for all pairwise comparisons).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we aimed to gain insight into the influence
of the motor system on perceptual awareness judgments. We
determined whether TMS-induced activity that was delivered
to M1 following stimulus presentation altered participants’
judgments of stimulus awareness, as indexed by PAS ratings.
Our results show that TMS congruent to participants’ responses
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FIGURE 7 | Mean amplitudes of MEPs for each PAS rating depending on
TMS condition and response congruence. Error bars represent SEs.
Significance code: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
TABLE 6 | Pairwise comparisons of mean MEP amplitude regression coefficients
of the linear mixed-effects regression model with interactions between condition,
congruence, and PAS ratings as fixed effects, and with participant-specific
condition effect, congruence effect, and intercept as random effects.
M1 PAS Estimate SE z Ratio p Adjusted
Incongruent 0–1 8.94 13.03 0.68 0.902
0–2 12.20 14.49 0.84 0.834
0–3 −38.64 19.19 −2.01 0.183
1–2 3.26 11.83 0.29 0.993
1–3 −47.58 17.39 −2.74 0.031*
2–3 −50.85 17.53 −2.90 0.020*
Congruent 0–1 19.94 13.60 1.47 0.458
0–2 6.23 14.62 0.43 0.973
0–3 −108.41 19.16 −5.66 <0.001***
1–2 −13.71 11.76 −1.17 0.648
1–3 −128.35 17.11 −7.50 <0.001***
2–3 −114.63 17.05 −6.72 <0.001***
P values adjusted with Tukey correction method. Comparisons of estimates
between PAS ratings for congruent and incongruent trials in the M1 condition.
Significance code: ***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05.
increased the reported stimulus awareness, but there was no
evidence for altering the extent to which they are objectively
sensitive to visual information. Moreover, no identification task
bias was observed. We observed longer awareness rating RTs in
the M1 condition in trials accompanied by stimulus awareness
that was vaguer than an almost clear experience. Despite using
a procedure with a delayed identification task, we observed
longer identification RTs in the M1 condition, in which the
TMS effect on RTs was limited to TMS-response-congruent trials.
Additionally, we attempted to determine whether TMS had an
influence on the metacognitive efficiency measure, but we found
no evidence to support such a claim. Finally, MEP amplitudes
were related to PAS ratings and response congruence.
Based on the presented data, we suggest that the externally
induced activity in M1 served as additional non-diagnostic
evidence for the evidence-accumulation processes underlying
visual awareness judgment and stimulus identification decisions.
In response to TMS, we observed prolonged activity of these
processes, predominantly when the perceptual evidence was
not fully decisive. Moreover, the process of perceptual evidence
accumulation also seems to be reflected in M1 excitability, which
is implicated by MEP amplitude.
Motor Information Influences Visual
Awareness Judgments
Our primary goal was to determine whether the activity of
the motor system can contribute to perceptual judgments. The
work of Siedlecka et al. (2019) has already shown that irrelevant
motor responses that share a response scheme with a visual
stimulus identification task increase reported stimulus awareness.
However, their design did not allow the exclusion of confounding
factors such as the introduction of additional visual information
or attentional engagement, because participants were explicitly
instructed and cued to perform an additional response (but see:
Siedlecka et al., 2020a). In this study, we expanded upon their
paradigm by applying TMS to M1 to reduce the influence of
these confounds. Nevertheless, our conclusions reinforce those
of Siedlecka et al. (2019): additional motor system activity can be
incorporated in perceptual awareness judgment.
Unlike Siedlecka et al. (2019), we only found indications for
post-perceptual evidence accumulation in response congruent
trials, whereas their results showed an increase in PAS ratings
irrespective of response congruence. This could be a consequence
of the fact that participants in their study performed an
intentional response before providing a rating. The additional
task was very simple so that participants could have both motor
plans prepared in each trial before responding to a visual cue,
which would increase motor cortex activity in both hemispheres.
In our study, TMS-induced motor activity could be weaker
than that related to actual movement, which might explain its
specific effect. Our results provide confirmatory evidence that
the findings reported by Siedlecka et al. (2019) were a result
of motor activity. Additionally, Filevich et al. (2020) conclude
that key presses in continuous report conditions served as an
additional source of evidence available for both the metacognitive
judgment and biased participants toward more liberal confidence
responses. A similar conclusion comes from the research on
perception of voluntary action where both active and passive
movements produced overconfidence (Charles et al., 2020).
A similar approach was undertaken by Fleming et al. (2015),
who used single-pulse TMS either before or immediately after
the 2AFC task response. In separate experiments, TMS was
applied to either PMd or M1. The results of PMd TMS
revealed higher confidence in TMS-response-incongruent (as
compared to congruent) response trials in error trials within
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the pre-response TMS condition. Moreover, for correct trials
in the pre-response TMS condition, a tendency toward lower
confidence in trials with TMS-incongruent as compared to
TMS-congruent responses was observed. This difference was
significant in the post-response TMS condition, but no M1 TMS
effect was observed. An explanation of the discrepancies between
their and our M1 TMS results could be the different timing of
TMS, its intensity, or the substantial difference in sample size (23
vs. 46). Our conclusions suggest that M1 TMS might influence
metacognitive judgment (although not necessarily metacognitive
sensitivity). Besides, it might also suggest that the PMd TMS
effect observed in Fleming’s study could actually have partly
been a result of an increase in confidence in TMS-response-
congruent trials, as indicated by their results, especially in the
post-response TMS condition. Providing additional activity to
the motor cortex might strengthen ongoing activity and increase
confidence in an already chosen response. In this interpretation,
PMd activity would reinforce the motor plan related to the
TMS congruent response that would compete with the plan
in the hemisphere related to the TMS incongruent response.
Thus, not only activity in M1 congruent to TMS would increase,
but this increase would cause inhibition of M1 in the other
hemisphere (Reis et al., 2008); as a consequence, activity in
M1 would not only increase confidence in congruent responses
but would also decrease it in incongruent ones. However,
since all our participants except one declared to be right-
handed the presented conclusions may not be generalizable
to the left-handed population. Future research could address
the issue related to the individual traits such as degree of
handedness or plasticity history related to manual training,
which could influence the interhemispheric communication
(Davidson and Tremblay, 2013; Kuo et al., 2019; Loprinzi et al.,
2020).
In addition, as might be supported by the analyses
of metacognitive efficiency measures, PMd and M1 might
differently impact metacognitive processes. Fleming et al. (2015)
reported lower metacognitive efficiency (measured with M-ratio)
in incongruent trials. Specifically, this was observed only for
the PMd TMS that was delivered prior to the identification
response. These results might further support the assumption
that information related to PMd activity is incorporated into the
evaluation of action performance. This could happen through
increased activity of M1 related to the alternative motor scheme,
which represents evidence against the chosen response. The
facilitation of the alternative response could impact confidence
and consequently lead to decreased M-ratio in TMS-response-
incongruent trials. This seems in line with research showing
temporarily increased excitability in M1 in response to PMd
stimulation (Koch et al., 2006). Importantly, stimulation of
the left PMd is often reported as affecting M1 in both
hemispheres (Fujiyama et al., 2016). In our study, additional
M1 activity would increase the amount of evidence for the
congruent response (correct or not), resulting in no change in
metacognitive efficiency measures while still impacting overall
metacognitive ratings.
In the study of Fleming et al. (2015), the only RT
effect observed was related to longer discrimination task and
confidence rating RTs in the PMd and M1 conditions when
TMS was applied after the discrimination response as compared
to before it. This effect was not replicated in the second
experiment reported in their paper. In comparison, our results
show longer PAS RTs in M1 condition compared to the control
condition when stimulus awareness was absent or unclear. The
slower PAS RT in M1 condition could result from a TMS
influence on the motor areas responsible for generating oral
movements (Möttönen et al., 2014); however, they were not
observed for all PAS ratings (as would be expected from the oral
movements impairment), only for the two lowest ones. Thus,
we consider these results to be a consequence of additional
evidence contribution to shape metacognitive judgment. We
assume that when the stimuli experience is not clear, the
evidence accumulation process operates for longer and/or with
a lesser amount of evidence. This could make TMS-induced
activity appear to be incorporated “on time” in a metacognitive
judgment but also cause the post-perceptual evidence to be
of higher importance. It might be the case that this was
possible partially due to the inclusion of the identification
response at the end of the trial so the accumulation processes
could last longer.
The nature of TMS experiments often makes the manipulation
apparent to participants. In our study, due to finger movements,
it might have been clear to them which condition was the
experimental one, thus triggering observer-expectancy effects.
However, this should result in differences between conditions
in identification accuracy or increase PAS ratings for both
congruent and incongruent trials, but these effects were not
present in the data. For the observer-expectancy effect to be
the case, participants would have to hold a specific belief about
the experimenters’ expectation of higher awareness in the M1
condition and TMS-response congruent trials. They would have
to remember to rate awareness as higher only when TMS is
congruent with the identification task response, or when the
Gabor is tilted to the right. The first would require the relatively
difficult task of making a comparison with a response that
follows an awareness rating. The second can be ruled out because
PAS ratings for right-oriented Gabor stimuli provided with
the left hand (incorrect trials in incongruent condition) were
not higher as compared to the control. An alternative possible
interpretations of our results are that TMS in TMS-response
congruent condition triggered a distraction leading to attentional
capture or influenced participants expectations, both resulting
in that the participants paid greater attention to right-oriented
Gabors in the M1 condition. If any of these was the case, then
we should have observed a difference in the identification task
performance and/or bias between the experimental conditions,
but this was not the case. Therefore, although the design of the
study cannot fully rule out attention or expectation effects, in our
view their influence in this study is negligible.
Possible Mechanisms of
Post-Perceptual Evidence Integration
Our experiment provides evidence for a distinct path in a
complex system that integrates information between perception,
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metacognition, and action. However, the structure of this
system and the nature of the interactions between its parts
is still largely unknown. This leaves an open question
about the neuronal mechanism that leads to the effects
observed in this study.
There is a growing body of evidence which shows that the
PFC, especially the dlPFC, can be considered a key structure in
integrating the information that is necessary for metacognitive
judgments (Rounis et al., 2010; Fleming and Dolan, 2012).
Assuming the central role of the dlPFC in awareness judgments,
there are strong presumptions to treat the TMS effects observed
in our study as an indirect influence because there are no
direct connections between M1 and dlPFC (Passingham, 1993).
This implies that the most probable route for the integration
of information from M1 is through the S1. Nevertheless, there
is ample evidence for the reciprocal connections between M1
and S1 (Gandolla et al., 2014), through which M1 activity
would influence S1 activity. Such S1 influence could resemble
feedback information about the muscle activation of the
response finger.
Information transfer between M1 and S1 through muscle
activation could explain why our experiment, in which TMS
intensity was above participants’ RMT, and the study by
Siedlecka et al. (2019), in which participants performed an
additional behavioral response, resulted in a significant influence
of experimental manipulation on awareness ratings. Both
explanations seem consistent with the results of Fleming et al.
(2015), who used TMS intensity that was below the threshold
of overt motor activity and thus limited the possibility of (1)
sufficient direct influence from M1 on S1 or (2) sufficient muscle
activity to cause somatosensory feedback. Similarly, Gajdos
et al. (2019) suggest that pre-response partial muscle activation
alters the somatosensory readout, which is later integrated into
metacognitive judgment.
However, the PPC would also likely be involved in integrating
somatosensory information with perceptual evidence from other
modalities. In normal circumstances, information from the
sensorimotor feedback loop would be used to compare executed
behavior with the motor plan that requires the engagement
of frontal areas (e.g., dlPFC and PM). The more pronounced
the mismatch, the lower one’s confidence in the accuracy of
one’s action would be. This might be why the procedural
manipulation of Fleming et al. (2015) resulted in a difference
in metacognitive efficiency in the pre-response TMS condition.
Their stimulation of PMd possibly altered the 2AFC task response
execution, thus creating a mismatch that was caught by the
error monitoring processes. However, TMS in our experiment
was delivered early enough before the identification response to
be integrated as post-perceptual, additional evidence before a
motor plan was fully formed. This would selectively increase the
evidence for a stimulus associated with a particular motor plan,
thus allowing participants to give higher metacognitive ratings
in TMS-response-congruent trials. Crucially, early integration of
this motor information would not create a mismatch between
the planned and the performed response, so it did not lead
to a change in metacognitive efficiency. The observation that
TMS-related evidence interplayed with the selected motor plan
suggests that either higher PAS ratings and longer identification
RTs in M1 TMS have a common cause, or PAS response provides
additional evidence for identification task decisions.
MEP as a Measure of Accumulated
Perceptual Evidence
Our additional hypotheses concerned the possibility of using the
MEP to quantify the neuronal correlate of perceptual evidence
accumulation. MEP amplitude is frequently used as a read-out of
M1 excitability state (Bestmann and Krakauer, 2015). Cognitive
manipulation of spatial attention (Mars et al., 2007), values
assigned to different responses (Klein-Flügge and Bestmann,
2012), or contextual uncertainty (Bestmann et al., 2008) can
all influence M1 excitability. Crucially, M1 can be treated as
a recipient of a decision process initiated in other brain areas
that modulates its excitability (Klein-Flügge and Bestmann, 2012;
Klein-Flügge et al., 2013). When a relation with a particular
response is present, MEP amplitudes for chosen versus unchosen
actions distinguish the forthcoming choice before completion of
the decision process (Klein-Flügge and Bestmann, 2012).
Our electromyographic results go along with these findings.
We found an effect of M1 TMS-response congruence: congruent
trials were characterized by higher MEP amplitudes. This effect
was observed predominantly when participants reported high
stimulus awareness. These results seem to be complementary
to the dynamics of perceptual and post-perceptual evidence
accumulation reflected in identification RTs. Taken together,
they suggest that for clearly visible stimuli, when the necessary
evidence has already been accumulated, the motor plan has
been selected prior to TMS, thus increasing M1 excitability
in preparation for execution of the response. Alternatively, no
motor decision has been made, but the perceptual information
about the stimulus has been passed from the visual cortex to
M1, bypassing the PFC (Goodale, 2011). Presumably, within such
conditions, additional evidence from the TMS does not play a
crucial role in awareness judgment. Contrarily, while stimulus
awareness is low, accumulation of evidence is still ongoing, thus
allowing TMS to play a noticeable role.
Finally, changes in MEP amplitudes might reflect
accumulation of stimulus-related evidence since the TMS-
induced movement and the identification response were
separated by several seconds, long before motor response
execution. This seems possible based on the presence of
connections from PPC to M1 (Gharbawie et al., 2011). There is
a substantive body of evidence that PPC serves a multisensory
integration function (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Koch et al.,
2007; Kaas and Stepniewska, 2016) and plays an important role
in performing voluntary movements, especially if they require
visual input (Vingerhoets, 2014). In recent years, there has been
growing evidence that PPC has direct reciprocal connections to
M1 (Schulz et al., 2015; Isayama et al., 2019). These connections
could serve as a potential pathway for perceptual evidence
accumulated in PPC to directly influence M1 excitability
in situations in which motor plans are simple or are executed
automatically (as in our experiment). This could explain the
differences in the excitability of M1 that were observed in our
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experiment in trials with high PAS ratings, as more information
would be transferred from PPC to M1.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our results shed new light on the relation between
action and perceptual awareness by providing evidence that the
motor system can be incorporated into metacognitive processes.
Combined with previous results, these findings broaden our
understanding of the interactions between action and conscious
access that allow humans to dynamically adjust and re-evaluate
their interactions with the environment. The significance of the
influence of motor information on awareness judgments calls
for broader theories of conscious access that primarily focus on
processing sensory input.
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Jonkisz, J., Wierzchoń, M., and Binder, M. (2017). Four-dimensional graded
consciousness. Front. Psychol. 8:420. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00420
Kaas, J. H., and Stepniewska, I. (2016). Evolution of posterior parietal cortex and
parietal-frontal networks for specific actions in primates. J. Comp. Neurol. 524,
595–608. doi: 10.1002/cne.23838
Klein-Flügge, M. C., and Bestmann, S. (2012). Time-dependent changes in human
corticospinal excitability reveal value-based competition for action during
decision processing. J. Neurosci. 32, 8373–8382. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.
0270-12.2012
Klein-Flügge, M. C., Nobbs, D., Pitcher, J. B., and Bestmann, S. (2013). Variability
of human corticospinal excitability tracks the state of action preparation.
J. Neurosci. 33, 5564–5572. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2448-12.2013
Koch, G., Franca, M., Olmo, M. F. D., Cheeran, B., Milton, R., Sauco, M. A.,
et al. (2006). Time course of functional connectivity between dorsal premotor
and contralateral motor cortex during movement selection. J. Neurosci. 26,
7452–7459. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1158-06.2006
Koch, G., Olmo, M. F. D., Cheeran, B., Ruge, D., Schippling, S., Caltagirone, C.,
et al. (2007). Focal stimulation of the posterior parietal cortex increases the
excitability of the ipsilateral motor cortex. J. Neurosci. 27, 6815–6822. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0598-07.2007
Kouider, S., de Gardelle, V., Sackur, J., and Dupoux, E. (2010). How rich is
consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis.Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 301–307.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.006
Kristensen, S. B., Sandberg, K., and Bibby, B. M. (2020). Regression methods for
metacognitive sensitivity. J. Math. Psychol. 94:102297. doi: 10.1016/j.jmp.2019.
102297
Kuo, Y.-L., Kutch, J. J., and Fisher, B. E. (2019). Relationship between
interhemispheric inhibition and dexterous hand performance in musicians and
non-musicians. Sci. Rep. 9:11574.
Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., and Christensen, R. H. B. (2017). lmerTest
package: tests in linear mixed effects models. J. Statis. Softw. 82, 1–26.
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010). How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness.
Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 204–220. doi: 10.1080/17588921003731586
Lau, H., and Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of
conscious awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 15, 365–373. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.
009
Lau, H. C. (2008). A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness. Prog.
Brain Res. 168, 35–48. doi: 10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68004-2
Lenth, R. (2019). emmeans: Estimated Marginal Means, aka Least-Squares Means.
R package version 1.3.4. Available online at: https://CRAN.R-project.org/
package=emmeans (accessed May 7, 2020).
Loprinzi, P. D., Harper, J., and Ikuta, T. (2020). The effects of aerobic exercise
on corpus callosum integrity: systematic review. Phys. Sportsmed. doi: 10.1080/
00913847.2020.1758545 [Epub ahead of print],
Lyyra, P. (2019). Semantics for subjective measures of perceptual experience. Front.
Psychol. 10:1980. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01980
Maniscalco, B., and Lau, H. (2014). “Signal detection theory analysis of type 1 and
type 2 data: meta-d’, response-specific meta-d’, and the unequal variance SDT
model,” in The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition, eds S. M. Fleming, and
C. D. Frith, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag Publishing), 25–66. doi: 10.1007/978-3-
642-45190-4_3
Mars, R. B., Bestmann, S., Rothwell, J. C., and Haggard, P. (2007). Effects of motor
preparation and spatial attention on corticospinal excitability in a delayed-
response paradigm. Exp. Brain Res. 182, 125–129. doi: 10.1007/s00221-007-
1055-4
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 13 October 2020 | Volume 14 | Article 580712
fnins-14-580712 October 9, 2020 Time: 14:51 # 14
Hobot et al. M1 TMS Influences Awareness Judgments
Möttönen, R., Rogers, J., and Watkins, K. E. (2014). Stimulating the lip motor
cortex with transcranial magnetic stimulation. J. Vis. Exp. 88:51665. doi: 10.
3791/51665
Mudrik, L., Faivre, N., and Koch, C. (2016). Information integration without
awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20:559. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.005
Murphy, P. R., Robertson, I. H., Harty, S., and O’Connell, R. G. (2015). Neural
evidence accumulation persists after choice to inform metacognitive judgments.
eLife 4:e11946. doi: 10.7554/eLife.11946
Overgaard, M. (2018). Phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B Biol. Sci. 373:20170353. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0353
Navajas, J., Bahrami, B., and Latham, P. E. (2016). Post-decisional accounts of
biases in confidence. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 11, 55–60. doi: 10.1016/j.cobeha.
2016.05.005
Overgaard, M., Rote, J., Mouridsen, K., and Ramsøy, T. Z. (2006). Is conscious
perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies
during a visual task. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 700–708. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.
04.002
Passingham, R. E. (1993). The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy–psychophysics software in Python. J. Neurosci.
Methods 162, 8–13. doi: 10.1016/j.jneumeth.2006.11.017
R Core Team, (2019). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Rahnev, D., Koizumi, A., McCurdy, L. Y., D’Esposito, M., and Lau, H. (2015).
Confidence leak in perceptual decision making. Psychol. Sci. 26, 1664–1680.
doi: 10.1177/0956797615595037
Ramsøy, T. Z., and Overgaard, M. (2004). Introspection and subliminal perception.
Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 3, 1–23. doi: 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000041900.30172.e8
Reis, J., Swayne, O. B., Vandermeeren, Y., Camus, M., Dimyan, M. A., Harris-
Love, M., et al. (2008). Contribution of transcranial magnetic stimulation to
the understanding of cortical mechanisms involved in motor control. J. Physiol.
586, 325–351. doi: 10.1113/jphysiol.2007.144824
Rossi, S., Hallett, M., Rossini, P. M., and Pascual-Leone, A. (2009). Safety, ethical
considerations, and application guidelines for the use of transcranial magnetic
stimulation in clinical practice and research. Clin. Neurophysiol. 120, 2008–
2039. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2009.08.016
Rossini, P. M., Burke, D., Chen, R., Cohen, L. G., Daskalakis, Z., Di Iorio, R.,
et al. (2015). Non-invasive electrical and magnetic stimulation of the brain,
spinal cord, roots and peripheral nerves: basic principles and procedures for
routine clinical and research application. An updated report from an I.F.C.N.
Committee. Clin. Neurophysiol. 126, 1071–1107. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2015.02.
001
Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J. C., Passingham, R. E., and Lau, H. (2010).
Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs
metacognitive visual awareness. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 165–175. doi: 10.1080/
17588921003632529
Sandberg, K., and Overgaard, M. (2015). “Using the perceptual awareness
scale (PAS),” in Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research, ed. M.
Overgaard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 181–196. doi: 10.1093/acprof:
oso/9780199688890.003.0011
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., and Cleeremans, A. (2010).
Measuring consciousness: is one measure better than the other? Conscious.
Cogn. 19, 1069–1078. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.013
Schulz, R., Koch, P., Zimerman, M., Wessel, M., Bönstrup, M., Thomalla, G.,
et al. (2015). Parietofrontal motor pathways and their association with motor
function after stroke. Brain 138, 1949–1960. doi: 10.1093/brain/awv100
Sergent, C., and Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon?
Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink. Psychol.
Sci. 15, 720–728. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00748.x
Siedlecka, M., Hobot, J., Skóra, Z., Paulewicz, B., Timmermans, B., and Wierzchoń,
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sure! Metacognitive judgments are less accurate given prospectively than
retrospectively. Front. Psychol. 7:218. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00218
Siedlecka, M., Wereszczyñski, M., Paulewicz, B., and Wierzchoń, M. (2020b).
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